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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER McELWAIN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SHIRLEY McELWAIN, 
Defendant/Respondent 
Case No. 900244-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 78-2a-3(2) (g) . 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Honorable 
F.L. Gunnell, Judge of the First Judicial District Court of Box 
Elder County, State of Utah on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the 
Divorce Decree. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The Trial Court erred in its finding that there had been 
no showing of a substantial change in circumstances allowing the 
Court to modify the Divorce Decree by ceasing or substantially 
reducing alimony. 
2. The Trial Court incorrectly applied the law by ruling 
that the voluntary nature of some of the Plaintiff!s changes in 
circumstances made those changes, per se, inapplicable towards 
modifying a Divorce Decree. 
3. The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding 
attorney's fees to the Defendant under the circumstances of this 
case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable F. L. 
Gunnell, Judge of the First Judicial District Court of Box Elder 
County, State of Utah on the 6th day of April, 199 0. Judge 
Gunnell denied Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree and refused 
to abate the remainder of the alimony payments from the time of 
the filing of the Petition. Judge Gunnell granted Defendant 
Judgment for unpaid alimony and one-half of Defendant's attorney's 
fees against Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff filed for this appeal with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on May 4, 1990 from the Amended Order signed by the 
Honorable F. L. Gunnell on the 24th day of April, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
That the parties were originally married on May 11, 1977 in 
the State of California. Sometime after that they moved to 
Brigham City, Utah and remained there for the majority of the 
marriage. 
Approximately two (2) years before the divorce the Plaintiff 
was transferred to California through his employment. Defendant 
was reluctant to move with Plaintiff to California and 
consequently, on January 14, 1987 Plaintiff filed for divorce. 
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There were no children born as issue of this marriage and 
therefore, the resolution of this matter depended mainly on a 
division of property. (Tp.19) 
The parties were officially divorced by Stipulation in a 
hearing before the Honorable Gordon J. Low on the 22nd day of 
February, 1988. The Decree of Divorce specified in Paragraph 4 
that, 
"commencing September 1, 1987, Plaintiff was 
ordered to pay the Defendant the sum of $550 
per month, as and for alimony and said alimony 
shall terminate at the end of August, 1990." 
Shortly after the divorce, Plaintiff remarried and took on 
the responsibility for two (2) stepchildren who were not receiving 
any support from their natural father. (Tp. 37) 
At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff reported income of 
approximately $48,000 per year. Defendant reported to be working 
half time at the library at Bunderson Elementary School, making 
approximately $375 per month for half time work. 
That Plaintiff continued his employment from the time of the 
divorce through the 3rd day of June, 1989. In April of 1989, 
Plaintiff received a letter from his employer, the Department of 
the Air Force, dated April 18, 1989 informing Plaintiff that 
unless he retired no later than June 3, 1989 he would lose 
forever, his lump sum annuity payment out of his retirement. (Tp. 
27) Plaintiff had been suffering from severe stomach ulcers for 
some time (Tp. 20) and did not want to lose his right to a lump 
sum payment from his annuity. Plaintiff attended a briefing 
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regarding this issue and determined from the information provided 
by his employer that he would retire effective June 3, 1989. (Tp. 
21) 
The Divorce Decree specified that Defendant would receive a 
share of Plaintiff's retirement pursuant to the Woodward formula. 
Plaintiff assumed that with the monthly retirement payment and her 
share of the lump sum annuity, that Defendant would be 
substantially benefited by his accepting retirement at age 60. 
Plaintiff had put in 3 5 years with the Federal government. (Tp. 
21-22) 
Plaintiff immediately filed a Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce on the grounds that his income had dropped by 75% and 
that his expenses had increased. 
For various reasons the hearing on the Petition was continued 
once because Defendant fired her previous counsel and hired 
Attorney Jon Bunderson and once again, because of a physical 
injury that Plaintiff had incurred. 
During the period of time while the parties waited for the 
hearing on the Petition, the government did not get around to 
paying any of the retirement benefits to either party until almost 
the end of 1989. (Tp. 25) Finally in a letter written January 
25, 1990 and mailed to Representative dinger in the State of 
Pennsylvania, who was looking into the matter on behalf of the 
Plaintiff, the United States Office of Personnel Management 
informed Plaintiff for the first time that because he had an ex-
wife, who under the terms of the divorce was eligible to receive 
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a portion of his retirement benefits, that Plaintiff was not 
entitled to take advantage of his lump sum annuity benefits after 
all. 
Plaintiff, depended upon his receiving the lump sum annuity, 
which he had been told would be close to $30,000. Plaintiff had 
borrowed against the future receipt of the lump sum annuity to 
move his family from California to Pennsylvania and purchased and 
remodelled a very small and simple farm in the backwoods of 
Pennsylvania, leaving Plaintiff with a debt load of over $80,000. 
(Tp. 23) 
Finally, in late December of 1989 the government started 
paying Plaintiff his regular retirement benefits, including a 
makeup check for the months wherein he was left without any 
income. (Tp. 26) There was no letter or documentation with these 
checks to inform Plaintiff as to what had been sent by the 
Retirement to the Defendant, although he was aware that a 
substantial amount of money had been withheld from his retirement, 
which he assumed had gone to his ex-wife. 
Then, in a letter dated January 4, 1990 the Office of 
Personnel Management informed Plaintiff that he would be receiving 
money back that was erroneously withheld from his checks. This 
he assumed indicated that the government had withheld too much on 
behalf of his ex-wife. These payments and letters all occurred 
prior to his learning that he would not be eligible for the lump 
sum retirement annuity. 
At the time of the hearing on April 6, 1990 it was learned 
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that the Office of Personnel Management had through its own error, 
sent all the retirement benefits to the Plaintiff and had informed 
Defendant's counsel that Defendant would receive all the back 
retirement payments due her in the near future and that Plaintiff 
would be further assessed from his retirement for money sent to 
him in error. (Tp. 32-34) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
That the Plaintiff presented to the Trial Court numerous 
changes of circumstances which under UCA Section 3 0-3-5 would 
allow Plaintiff to gain relief from the alimony awarded in the 
Divorce Decree. 
The Trial Court incorrectly determined that the voluntary 
nature of some of the changes made the Defendant ineligible for 
a modification. The correct rule is for the Court to look at the 
totality of the circumstances and allow each of the changes to 
apply such weight towards a modification as the Court can 
determine. 
The Court also erred in awarding Plaintiff to pay Defendant's 
attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN NO SHOWING OF A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWING THE COURT TO 
MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE BY CEASING OR 
SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING ALIMONY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions, spelled out 
the law as indicated in Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5, 
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(1953) as amended. In the case of Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 
P.2d 1256, (1977) Utah Supreme Court: 
"That section provides the Court with 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to support 
and maintenance of the parties and the 
children." 
The obligation of the Plaintiff in the present case is 
outlined in the case of Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d, 757 (1982). 
In the Haslam case the Supreme Court reiterated the general rule 
that: 
"The party seeking modification of a Divorce 
Decree must demonstrate a substantial change 
of circumstances." 
Plaintiff understood that general rule in the present case 
and proceeded, in the hearing for modification, to present to the 
Trial Court the following seven (7) changes in circumstances: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT REDUCTION OF INCOME DUE TO 
RETIREMENT, WITH HIS INCOME DECREASING FROM $4000 PER MONTH TO A 
LITTLE MORE THAN $1500 PER MONTH. By May of 1989, when Plaintiff, 
who had been contemplating retirement for some time based upon his 
ailing health, learned that if he did not retire before June 4, 
1989 he and his ex-wife would lose any rights they had to his lump 
sum annuity payment. At that time, Plaintiff had put in over 
thirty (3 0) years of government service and was entitled to retire 
with full benefits and therefore, he chose to accept retirement 
as of the 4th day of June, 1989 in an effort to reserve his rights 
to the lump sum annuity payment. 
This action resulted in a substantial change of 
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circumstances, both to himself and to his ex-wife. Plaintifffs 
income immediately decreased from $4000 per month to a gross 
monthly annuity rate of $2021. Plaintiff believed that between 
himself and Defendant they would receive a lump sum payment in the 
amount of $29,7 39. 
In addition, Defendant would receive, out of Plaintiff's 
monthly annuity rate, $312 per month retirement for as long as 
Plaintiff lived. Plaintiff simultaneously retired and petitioned 
the Court for a modification in the Divorce Decree relieving him 
of the requirement to continue paying alimony for the last year 
of his stipulated Decree. 
Plaintiff argues that the net affect of this retirement was 
to reduce his net income to approximately $1500 per month and 
increasing the income per month available to the Defendant by $312 
per month, exclusive of alimony,. 
Finally, there is no guarantee Plaintiff would live long 
enough to retire at age 65. Were he to die earlier, the Defendant 
would be deprived of these retirement benefits entirely. 
2. DEFENDANT'S INCREASE IN INCOME DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RETIREMENT. Because of Plaintiff's retirement, Defendant has an 
increase in her income in the amount of $312 per month, which was 
not available to her at the time the alimony award was entered in 
the Divorce Decree; 
3. DEFENDANT'S INCREASE IN INCOME DUE TO HER EMPLOYMENT AND 
HER CURRENT ABILITY TO MAINTAIN HER LIFESTYLE AND EXPENSES. At 
the time of the Stipulation in this divorce matter, Defendant 
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reported that she was working only part time and her income was 
less than $375 per month. At the time of the hearing on the 
Petition to Modify, Defendant reported that her income was now 
$895 per month. 
The hearing record is cluttered as to exactly when the 
Defendant received her increase in income from her employment and 
Plaintiff believes it is because Defendant remembers that she 
reported her income was only $375 at the time the Stipulation was 
worked out and that she was either not being completely honest as 
to her income at that time or that she was not being honest as to 
when that income change occurred at the hearing on Plaintifffs 
Petition to Modify. In either regard, the Stipulation was based 
upon her having the lesser income. 
The Courts have reviewed a number of Petitions to Modify 
support awards in Divorce Decrees and one (1) major issue that the 
Courts examine is, can the wife continue to maintain herself 
economically if the modification is allowed. In this case and 
according to Defendant's Exhibit "10", the Defendant was earning 
a gross income of $895, was receiving $661 for two (2) children 
in social security benefits and is now receiving $312 in 
retirement benefits from the Plaintiff. This is a total of $1867 
per month. 
Defendant's own Exhibit "10" indicates that her ongoing 
expenses required for her continued substanence at the level which 
she is currently living is $1713.08. Therefore, it is clear that 
with the income Plaintiff is receiving from employment, combined 
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with the retirement income, that she is making enough to meet her 
needs, plus a substantial monthly cushion. 
The evidence is equally clear that the Plaintiff, even 
without the ongoing alimony and alimony Judgment ordered by the 
Trial Court, is not making enough to meet his needs and if 
required to pay alimony beyond his date of retirement, will be 
forced far below the minimum poverty level; 
4. DEFENDANT'S DECREASE IN EXPENSES DUE TO THE SALE OF THE 
MARITAL HOME. The major reason for an alimony payment of any kind 
in this case was based upon the fact that Defendant was adamant 
about receiving the family home in Brigham City, Utah. The 
Defendant indicated during the time passing between the filing of 
the divorce and the final Stipulation that she was attempting to 
sell the residence. 
However, Plaintiff felt that her efforts were half hearted 
at best. At any rate, Defendant had from the time of the filing 
of the divorce through the time she actually sold the home, over 
three (3) years to try and dispose of that property. The 
Defendant made the claim at the hearing on the Petition to Modify 
that the reason she finally sold the home was that she reduced the 
price due to the fact that she could not afford it without the 
Plaintiff1s alimony payments. 
The fact remained that if she indeed was trying to sell it 
throughout that period of time as she testified she was, she must 
surely have had an inflated view of the home's worth all along and 
was not willing during that period of time, to reduce the price 
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to a level which would actually allow the sale. Only the 
Defendant really knows whether the lack of alimony was the real 
cause for her selling the home at the time she did and for the 
price she did. 
It does seem suspect in that after taking so long to sell 
during a period of time in which she was allegedly trying to do 
so, that she was able to sell it so quickly after the alimony 
decreased. This certainly leads one to consider that it is very 
likely that the Defendant decided to get serious about selling the 
home prior to the lack of alimony payments and that these efforts 
finally paid off when they did and she was finally able to sell 
the home. 
The case at the time of the divorce was void of the typical 
reasons for requiring alimony payments. There were no children 
born of this marriage and children that the Defendant had in her 
custody were amply supported by substantial social security 
benefits they received due to their father's passing away. The 
children in the home were not too young to allow the Defendant to 
leave the home and work. 
The Defendant in this case was reasonably educated and fully 
capable of employment in a number of activities, but chose to work 
in the library in the local school because she wanted to stay in 
Brigham City, Utah. She reported at the time of the divorce, that 
she hoped that the position would become full time, allowing her 
to receive a living wage; 
5. PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF CASH FLOW AND INCREASE IN DEBT DUE 
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TO HIS RELIANCE ON THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDING HIM AND HIS EX-WIFE 
WITH A LUMP SUM PAYMENT FROM HIS ANNUITY AND BEGINNING TIMELY 
PAYMENTS ON HIS RETIREMENT. 
At the time the Plaintiff made the decision to accept 
retirement, he was told that he and his ex-wife would receive 
their shares of lump sum annuity in a reasonably timely manner 
after his retirement and that the government would then begin 
timely payments of the monthly retirement to both of them. That 
Plaintiff then found he was ineligible for the lump sum annuity 
at all and was dismayed that he would not have that lump payment 
to assist him with his relocation to Pennsylvania. 
The Plaintiff was also greatly concerned that the Defendant, 
would also not receive her lump sum payment which he counted on 
as a buffer between her lack of alimony and the beginning of 
monthly retirement payments. 
Exhibit "2" was introduced by Plaintiff to give the Court an 
understanding of what the Plaintiff and his family had to do to 
try and survive during the year long period that it took the 
bureaucracy to figure out what to do with Plaintiff's retirement 
and to make the determination that he was not eligible for the 
lump sum payments. It took that long as well for the government 
to start making any retirement payments. As a result and due to 
no fault of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was completely without 
income for the better part of a year. 
Consequently, the Defendant also ran into some lean times 
financially because her share of the retirement was held up 
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inexplicably by the government for over eight (8) months. 
The Defendant, as she testified and as presented in Exhibit 
"10", with the income she was making and the $661 per child for 
two (2) children, made very close to enough money to get by, even 
without the retirement. 
However, as stated earlier the Plaintiff was in the position 
of trying to support his family of four (4) on no income 
whatsoever. It is important to reiterate that the lack of 
retirement income in the interim from Plaintiff!s actual 
retirement and the end of the year when the government finally 
made those payments, was due to no fault of the Plaintiff. 
The Trial Court seemed to infer that Plaintiff had something 
to do with the Defendant not receiving her share of the retirement 
during that period of time, when in fact the Exhibits presented 
at the hearing and countless other efforts initiated by the 
Plaintiff show that he attempted to get the regular retirement 
income coming, as well as the lump sum payments for both parties. 
6. PLAINTIFF'S INCREASE IN HIS COST OF LIVING DUE TO HIS 
REMARRIAGE TO A WOMAN WITH A DISABILITY AND TWO (2) CHILDREN FROM 
A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE. The Plaintiff remarried a woman, now Lucille 
McElwain, who had two (2) children from a prior marriage. These 
children were not being properly treated by her ex-husband and 
were not being properly supported either. The Plaintiff and his 
new wife hoped to be able to move from the California area at the 
time of his retirement and provide a stable home environment for 
the two (2) children. The parties had negotiated with the ex-
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husband and had made arrangements to adopt the children so that 
their lives would not be interrupted adversely by the ex-husband. 
The parties were unable to complete the adoptions, and the 
ex-husband continued to failed to pay child support. As a result, 
Plaintiff wound up as the step-father of these children and the 
only one available to provide for their support. 
Plaintiff's new wife, Lucille, suffers from physical 
infirmities that make it impossible for her to maintain 
employment. As a result, Plaintiff is the sole bread winner for 
the family and he attempted to support a family of four (4) on a 
greatly reduced income which resulted in a substantial change in 
his finances. 
In the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d, 1297, 
(1981), the Supreme Court of Utah indicated: 
"That the modification of a Divorce Decree, 
as a matter of equity, is the duty and 
prerogative of the Supreme Court to review 
both the facts and the law." 
Interestingly, the Court also indicated: 
"That while the fact that the ex-husband has 
two (2) children by a second marriage could 
possibly a show change in circumstances, 
substantially enough to warrant modification 
of child support provisions of the Divorce 
Decree " 
This language indicates that the Supreme Court is willing to 
consider voluntary changes of circumstances, such as the addition 
of children in a new marriage to warrant the possibility of 
modifying support orders in a previous marriage. 
In the case of Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P. 2d, 177 (1981) the 
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Supreme Court in another decision further explained the stated law 
by stating that: 
"In determining whether to modify a Divorce 
Decree, it is proper to consider obligations 
incurred since the divorce to support a new 
family, including a step-child,11 
The Court went back to the case of Wright v. Wright, 586 
P.2d, 443 (Utah 1978), which held that: 
"Undertaking to support step-children does not 
relieve the parent of his obligation to 
support his own natural children." 
and points out that the law, in 1979, was changed by the 
Legislature in Section 78-45-4.1 (1953) as amended, which provides 
that: 
"The step-parent shall support a step-child 
to the same extend that a natural or adopted 
parent is required to support a child." 
The Court made it clear in its decision that the obligation 
to support a second family does not replace the obligation to 
support the first family. However, it makes it very clear that 
it is certainly a factor to be considered in making a modification 
of a Divorce Decree and the Court, in the Openshaw case affirmed 
the Trial Court!s reduction of support. 
These cases and the statutes referred to above make it clear 
that these lesser changes of circumstances found in the present 
case can and should be used where appropriate to modify support 
payments awarded in Divorce Decrees. 
7. DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S HEALTH AND HIS AGE, IT IS VERY 
UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO REGAIN EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SAME 
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INCOME LEVEL HE PREVIOUSLY HAD AND A REAL QUESTION WHETHER HE 
SHOULD DO IT EVEN IF HE COULD. Plaintiff is 60 years old and has 
put in thirty five (35) years of public service through the Navy 
and through his Civil Service employment. During his employment 
he has risen through the ranks and gained positions of great 
responsibility and stress which result in being paid a decent 
income. 
However, this type of employment has not been without cost 
to the Plaintiff. He has not been able to live where he has 
desired, because his employment was always subject to transfer. 
The high level responsibility which he has assumed through his 
employment has caused him considerable stress, both professionally 
and in his domestic life, with the result being a number of 
serious ulcers and other related health problems. 
This case does not present the Court with the situation where 
a husband who knows a divorce is pending makes a radical change 
in the prime of his professional career in an attempt to make it 
impossible for an ex-wife to collect fair support. Rather, this 
is the case of a 60 year old man making a determination that due 
to internal and external factors, the time had come for him to 
retire from his professional career. 
He attempted to do so in such a way that his financial 
obligations and social responsibilities would continue to receive 
the necessary consideration they deserved. The Plaintiff in this 
case was fully entitled to retire. He had been eligible to do so 
for many years. He was told by his employment that if he did not 
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retire at the time he did, he would lose a substantial financial 
benefit that he would have no way of regaining. His motives in 
retiring were perfectly legitimate and honorable. 
This case, unlike many of the cases of a similar nature that 
come before this Court, presents a true win/win situation for both 
parties. The Plaintiff in this case was able to retire at an age 
when he was still physically able to enjoy retirement to some 
respect and the Defendant receives the huge benefit of being able 
to draw on her rights to his retirement for a full five (5) years 
prior to the time that the Plaintiff would have been forced to 
retire. 
In fact, Plaintiff did not act with the intention to hurt the 
Defendant at all. It was his absolute belief that the move would 
be advantageous to both of them; and 
These seven (7) elements demonstrated by the Plaintiff at the 
hearing to modify the Decree provided the Trial Court with more 
than enough evidence to find that there had in fact, been a 
substantial change in circumstance. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW 
BY RULING THAT THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF SOME 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
MADE THOSE CHANGES, PER SE, INAPPLICABLE 
TOWARDS MODIFYING A DIVORCE DECREE. 
The Judge fs ruling in the present case is sketchy at best and 
difficult to follow as he hops around to different statements that 
he seems to be espousing as legal doctrine to back up his 
decision. The Trial Judge seems to be saying that any change of 
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circumstances that does not result directly from an act of God or 
one forced at gun point, cannot be used as a change of 
circumstance for modifying a Divorce Decree. The case law in Utah 
simply does not support the Judge!s finding in this matter. 
Judge Gunnell also threw out language regarding a test in 
the "Moore v. Felmer case" (Tp. 105) , which is a case that 
plaintiff's attorney has not been able to locate. However, Judge 
Gunnell states that this test requires that "is she able to 
support herself now differently than she was at the time". (Tp. 
105) Judge Gunnell!s finding here appears to be directly counter 
to the evidence presented at the hearing which clearly indicated 
that with Defendant's income and the retirement income she would 
be receiving from Plaintiff's retirement, that she would have more 
than enough money than was necessary to meet her monthly expenses. 
Judge Gunnell went on to say that he was swayed by the fact 
that Plaintiff filed this Petition within four (4) months of the 
time the Divorce Decree was signed by the preceding Judge on the 
24th day of February, 1988. Judge Gunnell was grossly in error 
as to the time frame considered, as this Petition was filed almost 
a year and four (4) months after the Divorce Decree was signed. 
Perhaps if the Trial Court had not been operating under that 
misconception, the Court would have taken a Tftore careful look at 
the actual change of circumstance that did occur. 
The issue raised by this case is one that has been raised 
before this Court on numerous occasions. There is a large body 
of prior case law from which to derive guidance in deciding this 
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particular issue. 
As the Court took particular interest in the issue of the 
voluntary aspect of Plaintiff's change of circumstances, Plaintiff 
would ask this Court to review those specific cases referred to 
by defense counsel in closing arguments at the hearing on Petition 
to Modify. 
Defense counsel (Tp. 96) listed the cases of Westenskow v. 
Westenskow, 562 P.2d, 1256 (1977 Supreme Court) and Cumminqs v. 
Cummings, 562 P.2d, 229 (1977 Supreme Court) and finally, Carter 
v. Carter, 563 P.2d, 177 (1977 Supreme Court). Counsel made the 
statement in closing that these three (3) cases stand for the 
principle, 
"That a person is not entitled to voluntarily 
change their income circumstances and then be 
able to claim before the Court a reduction in 
their obligations. Of course, the reason for 
that is then everyone would do it. Everyone 
would start their own business or go to France 
to fulfill their life long dream to live on 
the left bank of the Seime and paint and send 
a letter home saying "I am sorry, I don't have 
any money because I don!t work anymore, so I 
can't send you any. That is the evil that that 
rule prevents and that is what is wrong here 
with the entire argument of Mr. McElwain". 
(Tp. 96) 
In reviewing those cases in the order presented by defense 
counsel in closing argument, we find that the Supreme Court in 
fact did not delineate such a rule, but rather reviewed the issue 
of changes of circumstances in a much more flexible and 
enlightened way. 
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In the Westenskow case the husband had brought an action for 
a divorce from his wife and was making approximately $18,000 per 
year, two (2) months prior to the divorce hearing. In that case 
the husband terminated his employment to start his own business 
just before the divorce and reported at the divorce hearing that 
he was making only $600 per month. 
The Trial Court in that case presided over by the Honorable 
Ronald O. Hyde of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, made a finding of alimony that 
appropriately took into account the fact that the husband!s income 
was temporarily reduced and awarded alimony on a graduating scale 
of $75 for the first six (6) months, $100 for the next six (6) 
months and $150 for the following four (4) years. 
The husband himself testified at Trial that he "expected his 
income to improve11 and the Supreme Court reviewing the husband1 s 
appeal indicated that 
"It would be reasonable for the Court to infer 
that either Plaintifffs income from his 
business would increase or he would seek other 
employment with adequate remuneration 
reflecting his historical earning ability." 
and found the Trial Court's award of alimony to be "well tailored 
to a situation which is not ordinary". 
Nowhere in this decision is there any statement of a rule 
that the husband was not entitled to consideration of his change 
of circumstances due to the voluntary nature of the change. In 
fact, the Court took the position that the husband was young, 
upwardly mobile and reading between the lines, probably felt that 
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the evidence was that he had quit to avoid possible payments to 
his wife. 
In Westenskow the Trial Court reduced the alimony 
substantially from what it would have been had he continued making 
$18,000 per year at the time of the finding and in fact, the 
Supreme Court ruled that if 
"Plaintiff's income has been seriously and 
permanently diminished, he may avail himself 
of l!UCA 30-3-5" to prove the necessity for a 
modification." 
Clearly inferring that even in this case where the husband 
abruptly changed his lifestyle and professional position just 
prior to coming to Court on the divorce, that if the husband were 
able to show that the change in circumstance was permanent, that 
he would be entitled to avail himself of the same provision of 
the law used by the Plaintiff in the present case. 
The Westenskow case clearly does not stand for the principal 
proposed by defense counsel in the present case and accepted by 
the Trial Court. 
In fact, Westenskow seems to stand for the fact that in a 
case like the present one where the change in circumstances 
regarding Plaintifffs*income is clearly a permanent one, that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to return to the Court for a modification 
based on a substantial change of circumstance. 
This language in Westenskow does not even take into account 
the fact that Plaintiff's decision in the present case actually 
works a financial benefit to the Defendant. 
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Next, in the Cummings case the Court found a strange request 
by the husband to modify the Divorce Decree in regards to alimony 
based upon his alleged change of economic circumstances. However, 
in that case the Defendant had a three (3) year history of making 
an average of $20,000 per year and had to admit on the stand that 
although his income had temporarily decreased to $77 5 because he 
had accepted a position as a Checker in a grocery store, which 
would soon turn into a position of Manager, that he also was 
receiving income from an investment of approximately $400 per 
month and payments from sale of a restaurant in the amount of $47 0 
per month and would receive in that same year, a down payment of 
$5000, The Court, taking advantage of simple arithmetic, 
determined that the Defendant's available income was the 
equivalent of $2 0,000 per year and that therefore, there had no 
change of circumstances at all. 
The Court indicated that it was the responsibility of the 
Court to "consider the parties respected economic sources", it 
must determine what constitutes the equitable share each should 
contribute to the household to maintain the family according to 
their station in life. 
The Supreme Court found that the Trial Courtfs decision not 
to modify was appropriate under the circumstances where the 
husband had available the equivalent salary he had previously 
earned and in addition, was about to improve that position by 
accepting full time managerial position. 
Nowhere in the Cummings case does the Supreme Court rule that 
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because Plaintiff's alleged changes of circumstances were 
voluntary, that they were not available to be considered in a 
modification of a Divorce Decree. That case merely determined 
that the Plaintiff's situation had not changed and further, that 
it in fact appeared to be improving. 
Applying the test actually delineated by the Supreme Court 
in the Cummincrs case would force a Trial Court to find in the 
present case that there was reason to consider a modification. 
As previously stated, with the added retirement income, the 
Defendant in the present case, had more than enough financial 
contribution to continue her financial station in life. The 
Plaintiff on the other hand had drawn to the very bottom of his 
economic resources and simply did not have the financial 
capability to continue paying alimony under the circumstances as 
they had changed. 
That leaves the case of Carter v. Carter in our effort to 
search for the Supreme Court's rule on voluntariness of change in 
determining modifications in Decrees as applied by Judge Gunnell 
in the present case. 
In the Carter case the husband requested a modification of 
the Divorce Decree regarding alimony alleging that his earning 
capacity in construction had decreased from $21,000 per year to 
approximately $12,000 per year due to his seriously impaired 
health. 
In this case the Trial Court had prior knowledge of testimony 
presented by this same husband when he had testified that he "was 
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a competent cattleman". It seems apparent that the Trial Court 
simply did not believe that this self employed individual really 
had a change in circumstances which was severely limiting his 
income at the present time. But, the Court went on to make some 
very specific statements about the state of the law in cases of 
this type. 
The Court stated that 
"the husband is mistaken in his assumption 
that the amount of alimony payable should be 
correlated in percentage to his income, to be 
scaled up or down as his income may vary. 
His earning capacity and his income are of 
course, important factors to be considered. 
But, that is only part of the total 
circumstances to be considered as to what is 
appropriate an equitable. Another major one 
is what are Plaintiff fs needs and 
requirements; and there is no showing that 
there has been any decrease therein.11 
In the present case again, the evidence at Trial was that 
with the increase provided by the retirement income, that the 
Defendant would have more than enough income to meet her needs. 
Further, there was a specific showing of a decrease in the 
Defendant's needs and requirements due to the sale of her home 
which had a substantially higher monthly payment requirement. The 
Court made it clear that it assumed that the ex-husbandfs income 
was likely to go up and down over the course of his life and that 
a lone was not the sole factor upon which alimony would be based. 
The only reference by the Supreme Court in the Carter case 
to voluntary change of circumstances concerns where the ex-husband 
in Carter alleged that his subsequent remarriage was causing added 
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financial obligations, the Court said: 
"It is usually said that subsequent 
obligations voluntary acquired should not 
reduce obligations under a prior Divorce 
Decree. While this is the primary and 
fundamental rule, it is likewise not absolute, 
but is still another factor which may be 
considered in determining what is equitable 
and practical under the total circumstances." 
The Court is clearly sending the message that it is not 
appropriate for a Trial Court to merely assume that an obligation 
voluntary acquired, post-divorce, can simply not be a reason for 
modifying a Decree, but in fact, that it can be considered as a 
factor when reviewing the total circumstances of each case. 
In the present case there is no question that in fact the 
Plaintiff's income has been substantially and permanently 
decreased. There is also no question that the act that decreased 
Plaintifffs income actually increased the Defendant's income by 
$312 per month. The additional factors as outlined in the seven 
(7) changes of circumstances above listed present a totality of 
circumstances which clearly Judge Gunnell overlooked when jumping 
to what he seemed to feel was an iron clad rule. 
A far more analogous case to the situation currently 
presented before this Court is the 1982 Utah Supreme Court 
decision of Haslam v. Haslam. 
In the Haslam case the husband filed for a modification of 
the Decree claiming that his retirement and his ex-wife's increase 
in earnings resulted in a substantial change of circumstances 
allowing termination of the alimony awarded in the prior Divorce 
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Decree. 
The Trial Court found that the ex-husband was receiving 
social security and pension benefits and stock dividends, as well 
as social security for his new wife and her minor child, resulting 
in a monthly income of over $1700 per month. The ex-husband 
alleged that he had monthly expenses totally over $1600 per month. 
The ex-wife at the time of the divorce was unemployed, but 
subsequently secured employment which paid her $1100 per month at 
the time of the hearing. In addition to that, she was able to 
draw interest from savings that she had accumulated. The Trial 
Court in the Haslam case dismissed Defendant's Petition for 
Modification finding no material change of circumstances. 
The Court reversed and remanded the Trial Court's decision 
in Haslam and presented the current status of the law as follows: 
"Provisions in the original Decree of Divorce 
granting alimony, child support and the like 
must be readily susceptible to alteration at 
a later date, as the needs which such 
provisions were designed to fill are subject 
to rapid and unpredictable change." 
This rule was previously stated in the case of Folqer v. Folger, 
626 P.2d, 412 (Utah 1981). The Supreme Court in Haslam ruled 
"On the instant facts it is clear that there 
has been a substantial change in 
circumstances." 
and held that 
"under the circumstances of this case we think 
that the combination of the supporting spouses 
retirement, together with the dependent 
spouses employment, earning of a substantial 
income and accumulation of substantial savings 
subsequent to the original Divorce Decree 
constitutes a substantial change of 
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circumstances." 
All of the factors referred to in the Haslam case are present 
in the case currently before this Court. The Plaintiff's 
retirement and the Defendant increase in income, along with her 
reduction in expenses, resulted in a substantial change of 
circumstances similar to the one to the changes reguiring a 
modification in the Haslam case. 
In the present case however, the Plaintiff!s remarriage did 
not result in an increase in monthly income to his current family 
and in fact, further diluted what financial resources Plaintiff 
had. 
In addition, in Haslam, the ex-husband's retirement did not 
confer a financial benefit to the ex-wife as it does in the 
present case. The Haslam decision was made without dissent. 
The 1976 Utah Supreme Court case of Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d, 
525, an ex-husband again had to appeal the Trial Court's decision 
not to modify his alimony assessment. 
The Supreme Court modified the Court's Order by reducing 
alimony from $300 per month to $1 per year. In that case the 
former husband's income had increased from $1300 to $2200 per 
month and the income of the former wife had increased from $2 2 0 
per month to $94 6 per month. The wife had also been able to 
increase her educational station by gaining a Masters Degree. 
In the Dehm case, as in the present case, the former wife 
could not claim that the alimony she sought was still needed for 
her support. The Court ruled 
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"in a situation such as this where the 
Defendant is gainfully employed, making a 
salary sufficient to satisfy her needs, is 
adequately housed and is of good health, one 
of the functions of alimony is not to provide 
retiring income. We do not want to confuse 
alimony with annuity. We conclude that to 
award alimony in these circumstances is 
neither necessary nor reasonable and reverse 
that part of the Trial Court's Order with 
instructions to reduce alimony to $1 per 
year.,f 
The Supreme Court ruled that even though the husband's income had 
increased substantially, the fact that the former wife was in a 
position to maintain herself on her own income and the other 
financial resources available to her, that it was appropriate to 
reduce the husband's alimony obligation to virtually nothing. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THIS CASE 
The Trial Court in the present case began its oral decision 
by stating that the case presented interesting and novel 
questions. There was no assertion on the part of anybody that the 
Plaintiff was bringing this action frivolously or in bad faith and 
certainly the Trial Court made no assertion that he had found 
such. Judge Gunnell ordered that the Plaintiff pay to the 
Defendant one-half her attorney's fees as documented by Affidavit 
of Defendant's counsel. 
This Order under the facts of this case was a clear abuse of 
discretion as the Court could not find that there was any evidence 
that the Plaintiff had been acting in bad faith or had frivolously 
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brought the Petition to Modify and in fact found, that the issues 
presented by the case were both novel and interesting to the 
Court. The Court would then have to find that the Defendant was 
clearly in need of receiving an award of attorney's fees. 
The Utah Court of Appeals case, Porko v. Porko, 752 P. 2d 365, 
(1988) stated the rule of law regarding attorney's fees in such 
cases, 
"That in a divorce action, award of attorney's 
fees must be supported by the evidence that 
the amount awarded was reasonable and the 
party receiving the award was reasonably in 
need," 
In the Porko case attorney's fees were in fact granted as the 
ex-husband's Petition was brought under circumstances where both 
Plaintiff and Defendant's incomes had increased and both their 
financial obligations had increased in a like amount. The Court 
specifically found that the former husband's appeal was frivolous 
in nature. 
There can be no such finding in the present case. Clearly 
the disastrous financial situation of the Plaintiff shows that if 
anything, he is in need of attorney's fees and that the Defendant 
is provided with an income sufficient to meet her needs and is 
able to pay a substantial amount monthly towards the reduction of 
whatever fees her attorney is intending to charge her. Therefore, 
the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding to the Defendant 
one-half the attorney's fees incurred in this case. 
In addition, in reviewing the Affidavit for Attorney's Fees 
submitted by defense counsel, it is found that a substantial 
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portion of attorney's fees listed in that Affidavit were incurred 
by defense attorney's efforts to determine what the Federal 
government's bureaucratic entanglements had done to his client's 
share of the retirement. These efforts would have been required, 
with or withPut the Petition to Modify, as they were required to 
particularly necessary to the issues of the modification of the 
Divorce Decree. 
CONCLUSION 
That at the hearing on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the 
Divorce Decree, the Plaintiff presented the Court with more than 
enough evidence that the parties circumstances had changed 
substantially from the time of the divorce. With that evidence 
the Trial Court erred in not granting Plaintiff relief from the 
alimony payments by modifying the Decree. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ Z V ^ Y 
JARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of th0 above and foregoing Plaintiff's Brief to counsel for 
the Defendant, Jon Bunderson, Attorney a Law, 45 North First East, 
Briqham City* Utah 84302, postage prepaid this /^y day of 
October, 1990. ~ 
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BRIG i lAU DISTRICT 
JON J. BUNDSPSON, £0437 
ATTORNEY F OP DEF ENDANT l i / iJ L J VJ J J Mil 
IN THE "IRST JUDICIAL, DISTRICT COURT OF 
BO', ELDER COUNT V. STATE 0- UTA-
PARKER M c E L w A I N , 
P I a i n t i f f . 
v s 
SH I RLE Y rlcELi'JA I N . 
UGte rJ8n 
AMENDED ORDE- WITH FINDIf\ 
OR PACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OP LAW 
Ji vi 1 No . E -'U0204 1" 
ne a D o v p - c a p t u n e d f l a t t e r came en r s o u i a r . v n e a r i n q 
BUNDERSON & BARON 
Jon J. Bunderson 
Roger F. Baron 
Attorntys al Law 
45 North First East 
8righam City, Utah S4302 
Tal. (801) 734-9444 
be f o r e t he He no r a b I a 
Court, on the 6tn ca': 
L. banneii , Judue of the above-ent i 11 ec 
o-t1 April 19 W0, on plaintiff's retition tc 
Modify Decree and defendant's Affirmative Request for Judgment 
for Unpaid Alimony and Attorney's Pees, and each party having' 
testified in the matter, and the Court having received several 
exhibits, and the parties having stipulated to certain matters, 
and based thereon, cased upon the files and records of the Court, 
and good cause appealing therefore, the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact, £-onclusions of i_aw and orders: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1 . The DecreE c f Divorce entered in this matte*- in F e b r u e »" v 
1988, praviced. amort: other things, that plaintiff was to pav 
defendant alimony ± <~ the Euf'> of 5i50.00 oer montn, to terminate 
a s oH 
i ^ the s ;J cr o £ 51 o 0 
AUG-st l O QU. 
M I C R O F ! L AA E D 
Case No. £ .A i. ._j^; 
MAY 2 4 1990 
Bv. 
BUNDERSON & BARON 
Jon J. Bunderson 
'<oger F. Barofl 
\tforn«ys at Law 
,S North Rrit East 
Jrigham City, Utah S4302 
• al. (801) 734-WW 
defendant was awarc-pd a ^Jooawa^n snare 0-+- o i a i ni i-*-"+" s L : 7 1 i 
Service Retirement. 
3 . Co ncerninc plaintiff's request to amend tJ Hca c»' e e o -t-
D i v o r c e , so as to e l i m i n a t e the alimony r e q u i r e m e n t s , tne Court 
finds as follows: 
a. The defendant's circumstances concerninc her 
empiovment and income nave not substantially cnancec si^ce r."E 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
o. The Defendant is not new able to support nerself 
tne same standard as when she and the plaintiff were rnerrieo. 
c. The plaintiff's income has decreased since the oa 
of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, due to his retirement on-
er about June 3, 1989. 
d. Plaintiff's retirement was voluntary and was 
optional with the plaintiff. 
e. The plaintiff's retirement occurred because of 
health concerns or retirement concerns or an opportunity for 
early retirement, but the Court finds that any health concerns 
existed prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and that 
plaintiff was eligible for retirement: prior to tne date of tne 
divorce decree. 
f. The. plaintiff chose, after the Divorce, to exerci 
his oc 11 on and r et i re and t hat this option e>•: 1 s t e c at 
entered into tne 01 vorce stipulation and at tne t 1 ^ e 
Qx- ti ne Decree of Divorce. 
: ''-e 
fcUNOERSON & SARON 
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Attornays at Law 
45 North First Eart 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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CI . he nlai nt> ff be I 1 eved ne na~ an . U n 
> m D B U re ce:v e his retirement contr1 butlons 1n a 
prior L o a ce r tain da te , which O D G G ^ t u n i t. v 
c-f tne di voi'CG, OL; t p I a i nt : f f •7 s i' e t : r eme nt .•;a s 
w as n o t -f o r ced to re t. ire. 
'- . T he Court cone I u des tta r c 1 a i n ~ i ~~ * e r • 
vo I L-nuar y. was not fnrcec. and therefore :.r?re 
chance of circumstances on his part, anc theref 
he ret i \'^a 
the date 
v • • •_• * because of his retirement, hecame voluntar: 
Since *ne only cnanae of circumstances on cne p 1 a : 
rinse? from his voluntary »'S t i r ement , the Cri-'t c: 
the plaintiff is not entitled to a reduction :n a: 
Court further concludes that there has Deer no su: 
of circumstances on the plaintiff's Dart because ~ 
-^or retirement existed at the time of tne ent^y o-
Divorce, and the plaintiff voluntarily chose to e-
eligibility after the entry of the Decree o- Dive-
5. The Court further c o n d u c e s that there a;-
applicabie standards under the facts of this case: 
plaintiff's circumstances have voluntarily cnance< 
defendant's circumstances have not changec; ov~. = = 
defendant's circumstances nave not cna need so r.na' 
~ ne ce -1"e n da nt , 
-emp1Gvea, 
; I T - : , E oart 
"luces that 
" :ny. The 
-.ant i a 1 cna r.gp 
.s eligibilitv 
_ne Decree of 
• •' c i s e that-
First, the 
•; n i 1 e 
idly, the 
~i e is able t. n 
s LI D D C t herself in the fas ^  ion t o w n i 
time o — the entry of tne Uecrse 
s t a n c a r d , tne C ou r L C O nc 1 'U ces 
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CUNDERSON & BARON 
Jon J. Bund«r$on 
koger F. Baron 
Attorneys at Law 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah &4302 
T«l. (801) 734-W4 
eliminate the all mo ny snouId De denled. 
6. The Court -finds that the plaintiff :s :n a; ''ears i r- hi 
alimony in the amount of $242.00 for the month of Aunust or 
Sen tern Dei' J988, and, further, .that n^ is in ak'iea<'s at the i-itr 
of $550.00 per month, commencing with tns- monui of June 198°, 
through and including the month of April 1990. for a total 
alimony ar^rearaoe. through anc including the '"onth o~ April i^°0 
of $6,292.00. T H E Court concludes tnat judgment should be 
entered in that amount, but that exeou" )n trie jupament snouic 
?e stayeG tor a perioa or six months, until uc 
'.. uEi'f e n G a n t s a. 11 o r n e y 
r-i o i - - ': QQf'^ 
'. H»t? LuU r"t t i n d b t 
incurred in this matter, pursuant to the proffer mace by the 
defendant's attorney at the hearing, which oroffer was accepted, 
and pursuant to the Memorandum of Attorney's Fees which has beer 
filed in this matter. are $1,192.00. The Court concludes that 
these are. reasonable, attorney's fees, given the complexity of 
this matter, the continuances granted, and the numerous long 
distance telephone calls made by defendant's counsel in an 
attempt to discover facts concerning defendant's share of 
plaintiff's retirement pay. Plaintiff shall pay one-half of 
defendant's attorney's fees incurred, and jucqment shall be 
entered against plaintiff for the amount of S596.00 -or 
a 11 o r ne v * e f ees . 
tnat z he L • n i ted States 0 *• " h e L ou •' ~ -£ i r\dc -
 P n f 
^'ev"Sonnel !vl ana cement w i l l or has sent a 1 et te*" r o defendant 
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concern: nq ner rirjr.ts to a ^nare of pi ^i nt : t + ' r r^ i, ; re^r^nt. a no 
tnat plaintiff wil i oe afforded a 30-say perioc in winch he may 
express any ocjecuon. Based upon defendant's request and 
plaintiff's testimony that re. does nor intend zo ma* e any such 
objection, una Court concludes that the olainti-f should not 
make anv objection to any agency or branch of tne United States 
government concern: no defendant's r iqht. to receive a portion of 
his retirement. 
9. The Court finds that plaintiff testified tnat he had 
saved $900.00 in a savings zccounz to De pa; c) to tne defendant, 
and the Court that this $900.00 should De paid tv tne plaintiff, 
to the defendant, forthwith, to be applied to tne alimony 
judgment granted herein, 
10. The Court -inds that plaintiff retired effective June 3 
or 4, 1989, and the united States Government did not send him his 
first retirement check until December, 1989. Furthermore, the 
Court finds that the United States Government has not, to the 
date of the hearing, sent the defendant her sha^e of plaintiff's 
retirement, nor has the United States Government withheld 
defendant's share «.f plaintiff's retirement fro--n plaintiff's 
retirement payments. Furthermore, the Court finds that the 
defendant has not received any aiimonv from the plaintiff since 
hay, 1989. As a result or these -^actors, tne Crurt finds arid 
concludes that the ce^endant ^as nan i^oosec ,t:n he*' a -^  i na nc i a i 
burde n. 
1 1 i -t r.ne i. nci es v a oI i sup -
;ourt made such a c c n o i t i o n . it ]t-
rtay of e x e c u t i o n ]s c o n d i t : o n e c u 
:efendant, f c t hw .i tc-, t ne s^m.G*- *t 
: h e a 1 i m o n y j u. d q m e n : . 
12. If the p l a i n t i f f -ilen = 
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I. plaintiff's request to te K~:nate or modify tne a"! ;mcny 
rsouirements o-f the Decree of Diverts is hereby denied. 
iSreDy Bntsrec ot tne GatenGc.nt .:. judgment i •; 
against the plaintiff. +or alimony arrearages through and 
including the month o^ April 1990. :n the amount, of $6,292.00, 
with interest thereon at the judgment rate from the date hereof. 
3 . Execution on the alimony a y~y' e a r a q e judgment is s t a y e d 
until October 6, 1990. 
4. Judgment is hereby granted in favor of the defendant, 
against the plaintiff, in the amount of $596.00. -for one-half of 
de-Fend ant's attorney's fees inc-urrec in this matter. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered not tc rake any objection to anv 
a o e n c v or or a n c h ot tne United b':< 
defendant's richt t e ^ t J . v t-
•D o v e r n m e n r r o n c e r n i n o 
? : : refuB ? 
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DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3.-4.1 to 30-3-4,4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals missioners, effective Apnl 23, 1990. 
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch Cross-References. — Court commissioners, 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, Rule 3-201, Rules of Judicial Administration 
authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Alimony. 
—Termination. 
Children. 
—Custody. 
Modification. 
—Support. 
Modification. 
Costs. 
Court's powers and jurisdiction. 
Property division. 
—Antenuptial agreement 
—Closely-held corporations. 
—Professional practice. 
—Retirement funds. 
—Time of valuation. 
Stipulations and agreements of parties. 
Visitation rights. 
Cited 
Alimony. 
—Termination. 
The test of whether termination of alimony 
is appropriate is whether plaintiff is able to 
provide for herself a standard of living equal to 
that enjoyed during the marriage of the par-
ties. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 
241 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Children. 
—Custody. 
Custody award to the mother, who had re-
married and taken the children to another 
state, was affirmed, where the trial court had 
considered the needs of the children and the 
parties' ability to provide for these needs, and 
had considered as factors in the custody deter-
mination the identity of the primary caretaker, 
the needs of the children for stability m their 
environment, and the identity of the parent 
who could provide personal care Myers v 
Myers, 768 P 2d 979 (Utah Ct. App 1989) 
Modification. 
If the initial award was based on a thorough 
examination by the trial court of the various 
factors relevant to the child's welfare, a rigid 
application of the "change-in-circumstances" 
criterion is in order. In such a case, the court 
has already considered the best interests of the 
child and made a determination consistent 
with that finding. Any subsequent petition for 
modification of custody must overcome a high 
threshold in order to protect the child from 
''ping-pong" custody awards and the accom-
panying instability so damaging to a child's 
proper development. Maughan v. Maughan, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
If the initial custody award is premised on a 
temporary condition, a choice between mar-
ginal custody arrangements, a default decree, 
or similar exceptional criteria, the trial court 
may properly focus its inquiry into the effects 
on the child of the established custodial rela-
tionship as it has developed over time. 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
There was no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's failure, after two days of often conflict-
ing testimony about child care and supervi-
sion, housekeeping, promiscuity, and sexual 
abuse, to find a substantial change of circum-
stances of the custodial parent that would re-
quire a modification of the custody award. 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
—Support. 
There was no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's determination that husband, although 
serving a prison sentence, should pay more 
than nominal child support, and m ordering 
that unpaid child support be subtracted 
monthly from his equity interest in the marital 
home Proctor v Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
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Modification. 
Trial court's apportionment of financial re-
sponsibilities will not be upset in the absence 
of manifest injustice or inequity that indicates 
a clear abuse of discretion. Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Costs. 
In modification of divorce decrees pursuant 
to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, 
the question of the ability or inability of a 
party to pay costs in defending the matter is a 
factual issue that lies in the discretion of the 
trial court. Hardy v. Hardy; 776 P.2d 917 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Courts powers and jurisdiction. 
State courts retain their traditional power to 
allocate federal tax dependency exemptions 
and have the power to order a custodial parent 
to execute a declaration in favor of the noncus-
todial parent, notwithstanding a 1985 amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Code providing 
that the custodial parent is automatically enti-
tled to the available dependency exemptions 
unless he or she "signs a written declaration ... 
that the custodial parent will not claim the 
child as a dependent." Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 
232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Property division. 
—Antenuptial agreement. 
A promise in a prenuptial agreement regard-
ing the disposition, upon divorce, of property 
brought to the marriage by the parties is unen-
forceable if it tends unreasonably to encourage 
divorce or separation. However, where an of-
fending provision of such an agreement is sepa-
rable from the rest of-the contract, the 
nonoffending provisions are enforceable. Neil-
son v. Neilson, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
—Closely-held corporations. 
Order requiring husband to pay out to wife a 
portion of the value of the stock in husband's 
closely-held corporations' was not an abuse of 
discretion/ where an in-kind 'division would 
have given the wife a minority interest in as-
sets over which she would have had virtually 
no control and from which she would have had 
no assurance of receiving income. Weston v. 
Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Professional practice. 
The goodwill of a professional practice is a 
marital asset subject to valuation and distribu-
tion in the appropriate circumstances. 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Trial court's valuation of the goodwill of hus-
band's dental practice, relying on the testi-
mony of a dentist who had been involved in 
brokering the purchase and sale of dental prac-
tices, was not an abuse of discretion. Sorensen 
v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah Ct App. 
1989). 
Trial court properly considered accounts re-
ceivable in its valuation of husband's dental 
practice, and any failure to consider the full 
amount of accounts payable was harmless 
error where the record was ambiguous on that 
point. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 
-(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Retirement funds. 
Decree postponing distribution of the hus-
band's retirement benefits for the purpose of 
funding higher child support payments to the 
-wife than would otherwise have been appropri-
ate was reversed and remanded for distribu-
f tion^because the retirement plans of both par-
ties should have been treated as marital assets 
and definitively dealt with in the decree as 
part of an equitable property distribution be-
tween the parties. Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 
232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Time of valuation. 
The marital estate should be valued as of the 
time of the divorce decree, and subsequent 
changes in property value, without additional 
compelling reasons, do not constitute a sub-
stantial change in circumstances upon which 
the trial court may enter a modification of a 
decree of divorce. Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Stipulations and agreements of parties. 
If the parties' stipulation is accepted by the 
trial'court and incorporated into its order, the 
subject matter of the stipulation is within the 
continuing' jurisdiction of the court. Myers v. 
Myers, 768 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App." 1989); 
Gates v. Gates, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Ct. 
App. 1990). 
A party may not obtain a stipulation based 
on a misrepresentation or material omission of 
facts and later claim that a child support order 
cannot be modified because there has been no 
material^ change in circumstances based on 
those * same undisclosed or misrepresented 
facts. Gates v. Gates, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
Visitation rights. 
Visitation order was affirmed, where the 
trial judge entered detailed findings of fact to 
support his award of custody to the mother 
which could be read to support his conclusory 
finding on visitation that the visitation sched-
ule he had devised was uin the best interests of 
the children." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family 
Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 216. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Family Law, 1989 Utah L. 
Rev. 270. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, 
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to 
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law, 
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955. 
A.L.R. — Separation agreements: enforcea-
ANALYSIS 
Change of custody. 
Factors in determining child's best interest. 
Findings required. 
Change of custody. 
In change-of-custody cases involving a 
nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court, in 
applying the changed-circumstances test, 
should receive evidence on changed circum-
stances and that evidence may include evi-
dence that pertains to the best interests of the 
child In ruling, the trial court should give sta-
bility of provision affecting property rights 
upon death of one party prior to final judgment 
of divorce, 67 A L.R.4th 237. 
Divorce and separation: attributing undis-
closed income to parent or spouse for purposes 
of making child or spousal support award, 70 
AL.R.4th 173. 
Divorce: propriety of using contempt pro-
ceeding to enforce property settlement award 
or order, 72 A.L.R.4th 298. 
bility and continuity the weight that is appro-
priate in light of the duration of the existing 
custodial relationship and the general welfare 
of the child. The findings of fact should show 
that the court considered stability as a factor 
in the custody decision and indicate the weight 
the court gave it. Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 
(Utah 1989). 
Factors in determining child's best inter-
est. 
Award of custody to the mother was reversed 
and custody was awarded to the father on ap-
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse 
— Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a 
divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, 
implicating either party, the court shall order that an investigation be con-
ducted by the Division of Family Services within the Department of Human 
Services in accordance with Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A. A final award of 
custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on that investigation 
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division 
of Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and request for an 
investigation. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, enacted by L. ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
1988, ch. 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 14. "Human" for "Social" in the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Investigation. tion until after the court had decided the case. 
—Time for request. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 
Husband's request for an investigation was 1989). 
untimely when he did not request an investiga-
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or di-
vorce — Custody consideration. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. fice of a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
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(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsec-
tion (b); redesignated former Subsections (2)(b) 
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
Cited. 
Habeas ^corpus proceedings. 
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is suffi-
ciently broad to include those cases where a 
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding challenging extradition. 
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals lacked original appel-
late jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of 
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate 
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to 
his underlying criminal conviction, except that 
"but for" the conviction, he would not have 
been incarcerated in Arizona and then trans-
ferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2)(b); desig-
nated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted 
'first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective 
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision desig-
nation (i) in Subsection (2)(b) and added Sub-
section (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic 
changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16. 
Post-conviction review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This statute defines the outermost limits of 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review. It is not a catchall provision authoriz-
ing the court to review the orders of every ad-
ministrative agency for which there is no stat-
ute specifically creating a right to judicial re-
view. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Ap-
peals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-45-4.1 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-4.1. Duty of s tepparent to support stepchild — Ef-
fect of termination of marriage or common law 
relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or 
adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon 
the termination of the marriage or common law relationship between the 
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support obligation 
shall terminate. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.1, enac ted b y L. Cross-References . — Adoption, Chapter 30 
1979, ch. 131, § 2; L. 1980, ch. 42, § 1. of this title. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
E q u i t a b l e es toppel . 
Since courts are reluctant to use an equita-
ble estoppel theory to impose a support obliga-
tion on a man who is not the biological father 
of a child, a stepfather was not equitably es-
topped from denying liability where there was 
His tory: C. 1953, 78-45-4.2, enac ted by L. 
1979, «qh. 131, § 3. 
Cross-References . — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title. 
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y Law. — Note, 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-
no evidence that the mother had attempted to 
collect support from the natural father, even 
though the stepfather had married the mother 
prior to the child's birth, and at one time had 
claimed the child as his own. Wiese v. Wiese, 
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
Child support collection, Chapter 45d of this 
title. 
parents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled 
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y L a w . — Note, A.L.R. — Stepparent's postdivorce duty to 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step- support stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520. 
parents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled 
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary obliga-
tion of support — Right of stepparent to recover 
support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive 
parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the 
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive 
parent as any other obligee. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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